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ESSAY

THE PRACTICE OF LAW AS PLAY
BarbaraStark*
Lessons of patience are learned slow.'
Lawyers work long hours. Some put in these hours because their
firms expect them to, some have bills to pay, and some are simply
workaholics. This Essay is not about them. It is about those
lawyers who put in long hours because they love what they
do-because practicing law gives them the kind of profound
satisfaction they once knew as children deeply immersed in play.2
They like winning cases and making money, of course, but for them
practice itself is rewarding-not always, but enough of the time for
them to feel lucky in their choice of work.
By "practice of law," I refer to a lifelong, ongoing process of
learning about the law and how to use it. This process begins long
* Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. BA, Cornell; J.D., Now
York University;, LL., Columbia University. Warm thanks to Dick Wirtz for asking the
hard questions, to Judy Cornett and Glenn Harlan Reynolds for their helpful comments, to
Katrina Bowman for her skillful preparation of the manuscript, and to my Legal Process I
students for their perseverance. This kind of interdisciplinary work is only possible with
help from friends in other disciplines, and I am deeply grateful to psychoanalyst Andrea
Remez and psychologist Helen Smith. I also acknowledge the generous support of the
Faculty Development Programs at the University of Tennessee and the College ofLaw, the
Lewis King Kreig and Waldrop Fund, the Carden Research Fund and the kind permission
of Cordon Art B.V. to use the M.C. Escher drawings, infc notes 48, 65. Gabrielle Cowan
provided
outstanding research assistance.
1
K.. LANG, Still Thrives This Love, on INGNUE (Warner Bros. Records, Inc. 1992).
2
Cf. ABRAHAM H. AlSLOW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING (1968) (providing 1960s
study of "people who worked hard not in order to get conventional rewards, but because the
work itself was rewarding"), cited in Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Introduction to OPTIMAL
EXPERIENCE: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF FLOW INCONSCIOUSNESS 5 (Mihaly Csikszeatmihalyi & Isabella S. Csikszentmihalyi eds., 1988) [hereinafter OpnMAL EXPERNCE].

1005

1006

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:1005

before a lawyer sees her name on the bar pass list. Rather, the
process begins when a law student opens her first law book or
attends her first class in law school.' By "play," I refer to the
process described in psychoanalytic theory through which adults,
as well as children, negotiate the terrain between inner and outer
reality.
This Essay first draws on the work of British psychoanalyst D.W.
Winnicott to define "play" and to describe its function in psychological development. It then explains the intense need for play during
law school and the virtual impossibility of satisfying that need.
Finally, it describes the happier prospects for play after law school,
at least for some. The Essay concludes that, while the practice of
law at its best is play, learning what you need to begin practice is
not. "Play" rooted in "not-play" is one of the first paradoxes of
practice, however, and paradox is what makes practice play.
I. PLAY IN PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY
In his groundbreaking work in the 1950s, D.W. Winnicott
suggested that play is best understood as "the beginning of the
developmental line of the ability to maintain paradox"--that is,
the ability to tolerate an apparent contradiction, including the

' It does not begin when she picks up her first John Grisham novel. While the process
may well involvepretending to be a lawyer, a4 in moot court and role-playing, see infra notes
42-45 and accompanying text (discussing these forms of law school 'play"), the focus here is
on the actual acquisition of lawyering skills, not on the idea, or fantasy, of lawyering that
may inspire that acquisition.
4 SIMON GROLNICK, THE WORK AND PLAY OF WINNICOr 34 (1990). Winnicott's influential
works include D.W. WINNICOTr, PLAYING AND REALITY (1971); D.W. WINNICOrr, THE FAMILY
AND INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT (1968); D.W. WINNIcOTr, THROUGH PAEDIATRICS TO PSYCHO-

ANALYSIS (1975). For a lively and accessible introduction, see MADELEINE DAVIS & DAVID
WALLBRIDGE, BOUNDARY AND SPACE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE WORK OF D.V. wINNICOTr

(1990).

See generally ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (1963) (describing

psychoanalysis as the study of the ego's roots in social organization). Psychologists who are
not as psychoanalytically-oriented approach play from a different perspective and with
different objectives. They focus more on social contexts, such as the family and the school,
rather than the intrapsychic constructs established in infanthood. Psychoanalysts are more
likely to focus on the ways in which these intrapsychic constructs are replicated or sought
in later social contexts. See, e.g., JEAN PIAGET, PLAY, DREAMS AND IMITATION INCHILDHOOD

(C.Gattegno &F.M. Hodgson trans., 1951).
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illusion that what we create at play really exists.8 Play becomes
possible, according to Winnicott, when an infantes needs are
anticipated by an attentive parent. The infant comes to connect
her wish for milk, warmth, and cuddling with the appearance of the
bottle, breast, and parent. The belief that her wish "creates" the
breast is the source of the sense of magic and power that makes
play so delicious,7 and it is also the source of the child's make-

believe and the adult's creativity.'

The belief alone, however, is

not play.
Play is the process through which the infant, and later the child
and the adult, integrates her inner reality-what she wants from

the world-and the outer reality-what is actually obtainable. Play
takes myriad forms. As Winnicott notes,
[T]he content does not matter. What matters is the
near-withdrawal state, akin to the concentration of
older children and adults. The playing child inhabits
an area that cannot be easily left, nor can it easily
admit intrusions. This area of playing is not inner
psychic reality. It is outside the individual, but it is
not the external world. Into this play area the child
gathers objects or phenomenon from external reality

5

Winnicott referred to play as 'our first illusion." PLAYIO AND REALnY, supra note 4,
at 14.
6
PLAYING AND REAIrY, supra note 4, at 12. Winnicott consistently refers to "mother
rather than "parent," which has earned him the disapproval of many feminists. See, eg.,
JANICE DOANE & DEVON HODGES, FROM KLEIN TO KIuSTEVA 7-33 (1992). But ef NANcY J.
CHODOROW, MIM AND PSYCHOANALYnC THEORY 152-43 (drawing on Winnicottto "begin
to imagine not only liberated individuals, but individuals mutually engaged in a society built
on liberated forms of social life"). The extent to which the concept of play, as well as its
endless forms, may be gendered is beyond the limited purposes of this Essay, which is to
introduce the psychoanalytic concept ofplay and apply it in the context of the practice oflaw.
1'The mother's adaptation to the infant's needs, when good enough, gives the infant the
illusion that there is an external reality that corresponds to the infants own capacity to
create." PLAYING AND REAtITY, supra note 4, at 12; accord GROLNICI, supra note 4, at 35
(citing Judith Kestenberg (1971)).
8
' This] constitutes the greater part of the infant's experience, and throughout life is
retained in the intense experiencing that belongs to the arts and to religion and to
imaginative living, and to creative scientific work.* PLAYING AND REALIr, supra note 4, at
14.
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and uses these in the service of some sample derived
from inner or personal reality.9
As examples of play, Winnicott describes a baby playing with a
tongue depressor, mouthing it and throwing it on the floor;' an
older child using a string first to tie objects together, later as a
tether, and finally as nesting material;11 and a middle-aged
woman creating a verbal game using bits of poetry.' It is not the
form of the play that matters, but the player's creation of it.
Play begins in what Winnicott describes as the "transitional"
space between a parent and an infant. This is an intimate, safe
space, which the infant experiences as both an extension of herself
and as fascinatingly "other"-as "me" and "not me." This is the
infant's first experience of the "intermediate mental space of the
imagination and of the symbolic world that so epitomizes the
human animal."" Transitional space also has a temporal aspect;
it is an interval, a period of time during which the infant can
explore this interesting new realm.
Throughout this process, and crucial to its effectiveness, the
infant must be able to control the pace and even to opt out-that
is, to drop into the "steady backdrop of a holding environment."1 '
This has been described as the "sense that one is held; that there
is a safety net present rather than the hard concrete of the circus
floor; that one won't be dropped, physically or metaphorically; that
one can experience one's self and be one's self."15
9
Id. at 51. "The thing about playing is always the precariousness of the interplay of
personal psychic reality and the experience of control of actual objects. This is the
precariousness of magic itself ....
Id. at 47.
'I Id. at 48-49.
1
1Id. at 42-43.
'2Id. at 62-64; see also infra note 41 (citing examples of play in legal scholarship).
1GROLNICK, supra note 4, at 34. For a classic exploration of symbolic, childhood play,
see PIAGET, supra note 4. See generally DAVID COHEN, THE DEvELOPMENT OF PLAY (2d ed.
1993) (discussing development of play and arguing for more rounded view).
This transitional state, like the other elements of "play," recurs throughout life. It
assumes various forms, not all of which are particularly pleasant. 'he brief but intense
boredoms of childhood are reactive to no great loss, but are merely an interruption-after
something and before something else. Like all genuine transitional states, their destination
is unclear." ADAM PHILLIPS, On Being Bored, in ON KISSING, TICKLING, AND BEING BORED:

PSYCHOANALYTIC EssAYs ON THE UNEXAMINED LIFE 68, 72 (1993).

"' GROLNICK, supra note 4, at 37. For a concise summary of play, see PLAYING AND
REALITY, supra note 4, at 51-52.
1GROLNICK, supra note 4, at 30.
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According to Winnicott, play serves several distinct but related
functions, each contributing to psychological and intellectual
development. First, play provides an outlet for tension as well as
a constructive channel for it. Second, play structures social
interaction and "helps [to] define and redefine the boundaries
between ourselves and others...

."'

Third, play provides an

opportunity to practice skills and work through problems. Fourth,
play enriches experience, in that it "helps give us a fuller sense of
our own personal and bodily being ...

and ...

enhances drive

satisfaction."' 7 Finally, Winnicott recognizes the importance of
play for its own sake.'
Winnicott assumes the ongoing relevance of play, not only
throughout childhood, but throughout adult life as well.' Play
continues as the process through which we integrate inner reality

'Id. at 35.
17 Id. Winnicott is careful to distinguish play from a drive, such as hunger or sex,
however. Indeed, when play becomes too "drive-infested," it looses its "creative growthbuilding capability." Id.
'sAccord Csikszentmihalyi, supranote 2, at 5. Csikszentmihalyi uses the term 'flow to
refer to the intense focus and deep pleasure experienced during intellectual or other creative
activity. "Flow" may be understood as a particular form of play:.
Flow is made up of a limited number of essential elements. For flow to
occur outcomes must be significant and determined by individual
volitional actions; the act must be intrinsically rewarding, occasioned by
a merging of action and awareness, an absence of self-consciousnesa; and
action must take place in a limited stimulus field.
Richard G. Mitchell, Jr., Sociological Implications of the Flow Experience, in OPTI MAL
EXPERIENCE, supra note 2, at 36, 53-54. For the argument that flow may serve as a
"dynamic force in evolution," see id. at 30.
29
It is assumed here that the task ofreality-acceptance is never completed,
that no human being is free from the strain of relating inner and outer
reality, and that relief from this strain is provided by an intermediate
area of experience ... in direct continuity with the play area of the small
child who is "lost"in play.
PLAYING AND REALITY, supra note 4, at 13. 'To live creatively the individual has to go on
being able to find his own inner reality-that part of the self from which the dream
emanates--through a personal way of experiencing external reality." DAVIS & WALLBEIDGE,
supra note 4, at 63.
A crucial part of Wmnicott's therapy with adult patients was to remind them how to play.
He did so through his famous "squiggle" game, in which he would draw an arbitrary line, the
patient would next take a turn drawing an additional line, and so on, both describing what
was being created. GROLNICF, supra note 4, at 36. Cf COHEN, supra note 13, at 7 (noting
that Piaget and Freud considered play basically preserve of children). Winnicott never fully
developed his theory ofplay in the context of adult experience. He died while going over the
proofs for Playingand Reality.

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

1010

[Vol. 30:1005

and outer reality.20 Adult's play, like child's play, requires a safe
space, time, and something or someone to play with.21 Like the
child, the adult at play must be able to set her own pace and to
drop into a "holding environment" when necessary.'
Play enables adults to maintain paradox-to tolerate and accept
apparent contradictions-just as play enables the infant to
maintain the paradox of "me" and "not me." The ability to
maintain paradox is central to the practice of law.' It enables
lawyers to entertain inconsistent theories, to tolerate uncertainty,
to see the ambiguity in an open-and-shut case, and to transform a
stark win-lose dichotomy into a dazzling array of options.
II.

PLAY AND THE LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENCE

Students in law school need play more than they did in college,
and they get less. Students need play more because law school
demands massive integration-of doctrine and its application
within each class; of different analytical frameworks and processes
among classes;' 4 and, ultimately, of the student's inner reality and
the outer reality of law school and the legal world beyond. It is
through this multilevel, multistage process of integration that the
student who enters law school transforms herself into the lawyer
who emerges.2'

Io' P]laying is an experience, always a creative experience, and it is an experience in the
space-time continuum, a basic form of living.* PLAYING AND REALITY, aupranote 4, at 50.
21 Christopher Bollas describes a "transformational object'; that is, "anobject that is
experientially identified by the infant with the process of the alteration of self-experience ...
in adult life, the quest is not to possess the object; it is sought in order to surrender to it as
a process that alters the self." PHILLIPS, supranote 13, at 76-77 (attributing views to Bollas).
See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (discussing holding environment).
"The 'serious' institutions that constitute society-science, the law, the arts, religion,
and even the armed forces-all started out as games, as contexts in which people could play
and experience the enjoyment of goal-directed action." Mihaly Csikazentmihalyi, The Flow
ExperienceandIts Significancefor Human Psychology, in OPTIMAL EXPERIENCE, supra note
2, at 15, 34 (citing Huizinga).
2' The mere quantum of information which students are required to assimilate does not
in itself demand play. Indeed, many students come to law school because of the relative ease
with which they can absorb new information and the pleasure they take in the 'game' of
learning.
' This resonates with Winnicott's description of "play* as part of self-creation. PLAYING
AND REALaTY, supra note 4, at 64. Because the integration of doctrine and process during
law school effectively precludes the "play" necessary to integrate inner and outer realities,
the new lawyer rarely feels that the transformation is complete.

1996]

LAW AS PLAY

1011

The integration of material within a single class, while probably
the simplest integration required in law school, suggests the
magnitude of the task.'
In common law legal analysis, for
example, students learn that to analogize the facts of the problem
to the facts of the precedent, they must be able to describe those
facts in varying degrees of generality and specificity. A teacher in
a first-year class may hold up a watch and invite students to
describe it, starting generally ("an object") and ending specifically
("a small white Timex with arabic numerals and a brown leather
band belonging to the teacher").' Students learn that seemingly
straightforward facts can be expressed in an indefinite number of
ways.
This is rich territory for play. Forget your previous notions of
"truth" or objective reality, students are told, "it is all relative; it
can all be manipulated." Some students want to play with the
idea-to explore its personal implications. They wonder, "Isn't one
description less true than another? Is it dishonestto argue in favor
of the less true description? How far is too far?" Teachers are
rewarded for answering these questions so as to further the
pedagogical purpose of the exercise.' A teacher might reply, for
example, "It depends on the legal issue. If the issue is whether the
plaintiff should have known the time, a watch and a clock are
analogous. If the issue is whether a watch is included in a bequest
of 'household furnishings,' they are not." By answering the
question in this way, the teacher frustrates the student's attempt
to play. She also introduces one of the most common games in law
school-turning another person's question to your own purposes.
But this is not "play."'
Even the students who are comfortable manipulating abstractions, and are not distracted by actual human experience, are likely
to be frustrated. In civil procedure, for example, students learn the

' For a fresh introduction to the law, which suggests that the task may be easier than
students and teachers think, see Jeremy Paul, A Bedtime Story, 74 VA. L, REV. 915 (1988).
' This exercise is suggested by RICHARD K. NEUMAMN, JIL, LEGAL REASONMO AND LEGAL
WRrNG: STRUCTURE, STRATEGY AND STYLE 22-26 (1990).
' These rewards include the knowing smiles of the students who *gee it, student
evaluations, and peer review.
I Games are more formal than play. One of Freud's 'favorite metaphors for the analytic
situation was that of the chess game, with its prescribed rules. GROLNIC, supra note 4, at
36 (citing Andr4 Green (1978)); see also infra note 39 (noting use of games as method to
forestall frightening aspects of play).
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elements necessary for a court to assert jurisdiction. Then they
read Kulko, in which these elements are technically satisfied."0
A technical application of these elements to the facts in Kulko,
however, would have punished a cooperative father in New York for
allowing his children to visit his ex-wife, their mother in California,
by subjecting him to the jurisdiction of the California court. 1
Students who have simply applied the technical rules, thinking
they have caught on to the game, find that the rules have abruptly
changed. The manipulation of abstraction, however proficient, is
not enough.
Rather, the problem is broken down into a series of judgment
calls. How strong is the precedent? How similar are the facts?
What are the policy arguments, if any, demanding a different
result? Teachers tell students that it is the law's openness, its
indeterminacy, that assures their future livelihood and makes it
possible to effectuate change within the system. But to many
students, the initial experience of that indeterminacy feels like
32
swinging high above the "hard concrete of the circus floor"
without a net. Being asked a question in a first-year class is like
being asked to leap into the void.'
Simply going from one class to the next may also require a leap,
although both teachers insist that they are talking about the same
body of law. The correct answer to a question in torts class is
never, "File in another state where the law is more favorable,"
although the civil procedure teacher has just explained the options
for doing so.3' Because it distracts from the torts teacher's story
of the doctrinal development of torts, the student's effort to
integrate 35torts and civil procedure is likely to be cut off as a
"tangent."

"Kulko v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84 (1978). I am indebted to John Sobieski for
this application of this case.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text (quoting Grolnick's description of a holding
environment).
' Relatively well settled doctrine begins to look like a safety net, but the hard work of
teaching is to expose the indeterminacy even there. For a rich exploration, focusing on
purportedly race-neutral doctrine, see Frances L. Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum in
Legal Education, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1511 (1991).
In practice, this may well be the preferred approach.
Indeed, other students are usually less tolerant of tangents than are teachers. If the
cutting-off is done amiably, the student may seek the teacher out later and discuss the
overlap, as well as the lacunae, between doctrinal subjects and the debate within the

1996]

LAW AS PLAY

1013

A student's attempt to integrate her inner reality and the outer
reality of law school6 is likely to lead to even greater frustration. s In criminal law, for example, students learn to distinguish
between proving the elements of a crime-that is, establishing legal
guilt-and merely "knowing" that one person killed another. The
student who balks at these distinctions, the student deeply troubled
by what she sees as the moral ambiguity of criminal law, may be
veering toward a rich jurisprudential vein. The teacher cannot
encourage such veering during class, however, without abandoning
all hope of covering the material.3
I do not mean to suggest that play is impossible in law school.
There are always some opportunities and students seize them
eagerly. These are tremendously expensive in terms of time,
however, and considerably more structured than the "play"
Winnicott describes.39 Law review, for example, links students to
the "outer reality" of the legal academy.'
It also provides an
opportunity for a few students to write, to integrate materials
creatively. 4 ' Moot court similarly offers an integrative writing

academy about discourse boundaries. She may even ask for, and be given, cites to law
review articles on the subject. Even if this occurs, and it does not occur as often as it should,
the point here is that this is not part of the classroom experience.
I For a thoughtful essay on the difficulties of trying to help students do so, see Katharine
T. Bartlett, Teaching Values: A Dilemma, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 519, 520-21 (1987). For a
succinct description of the "ordinary" assumptions of this outer reality, see Roger C.
Cramton, The OrdinaryRligion of the Law School Clasroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 247, 248
(1978).
' The student will be told to *be objective," that is, to forget, or ignore, her subjective
reactions and even her own personal experience. Her awkward questions-and they are
bound to be awkward because they are framed in a made-up language--are at best likely to
be dismissed with, "Interesting question, but I am not going to spend class time on it."
31 If she does not cover the material, some of her students will not pass the exam, and
some may lose a few points on the bar exam.
I aGames and their organization must be looked at as part of an attempt to forestall the
frightening aspect of playing." PLAYING AND REALM, aupra note 4, at 50.
I The legal academy's links to 'reality" are regularly questioned, of course. See, eg.,
John T. Noonan, Jr., Law Reviews, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (1995) (Academic isolation
from the larger world may explain at least in part the reviews' relative indifference to
judicial integrity and to the much greater problems presented by ... corruption....7).
11 Examples of "play in legal scholarship include JAL Balkin, The Footnote,83 Nw. U.J
REV. 275 (1988) and Gretchen C. Rubin & Jamie G. Heller, The Restatement of Love
(Tentative Draft), 104 YALE LJ. 707 (1995). The first example draws the reader into a clever
exploration, and a deeper understanding, of the relationship between text and subtext.
Professor Balkin ends by inviting the law review editors to place the entire article in the
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experience. It adds another dimension by allowing students to play
lawyer over time, returning again and again to the same role, each
return adding new depth to the student's understanding. 42
There are even opportunities for play in class. Some teachers, for
example, deliberately incorporate play in the classroom through
role-playing and experiential learning.' Law school clinics probably offer the experience closest to "play." First, clinics allow
students to "play lawyer," often in a personally meaningful
context.'
Second, they allow students to integrate skills and
doctrine learned in different law school classes and to refine this
integration with the help of thoughtful feedback from clinical
teachers.' Third, clinics link students to the "outer reality" of a
real community and real clients.
All of these activities, however, are generally regarded as
luxuries within the law school culture, in terms of money as well
as time. Accordingly, they are available to few students and

final footnote. The Restatement of Love translates the undefinable, inexplicable, and
overwrought process of falling in love into impeccable legalese, an ironic comment on both
the experience and the law.
" See Barbara B. Woodhouse, Mad Midwifery: Bringing Theory, Doctrine, and Practice
to Life, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1977, 1986 (1993) (describing value of moot courts and role-playing
in the classroom: "Short ofactual client representation, nothing focuses a student's attention
like the eye of the camera, a well-prepared opposing counsel, and the scrutiny of a 5udge.' ")
See generally Paul Bergman et al., Learning From Experience: Nonlegally.Specific Role
Plays, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 535 (1987) (describing value of non-legally specific role playa).
,"See, e.g., William S. McAninch, ExperientialLearning in a TraditionalClassroom, 36
J. LEGAL EDUC. 420 (1986) (demonstrating that experimental learning can be effectively and
economically employed as adjunct to traditional methodologies); Woodhouse, oupra note 42
(describing value of moot court and role-playing in the classroom). For an exploration of the
relationship between experiential learning and moral development, see Steven Hartwell,
PromotingMoral Development Through Experiential Teaching, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 605
(1995); Stephanie M. Wildman, The Question of Silence: Techniques to Ensure Full Class
Participation,38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 147 (1988). Cf PLAYING AND REALITY, supranote 4, at 57
("My reward for withholding interpretations comes when the patient makes the interpretations herself, perhaps an hour or two later.").
"I am thinking here specifically of clinical programs like those offered at the University
of Tennessee, Rutgers University, and American University, which allow students to chose
among subject matters and client groups. Cf Mitchell, supra note 20, at 52 ("What is
missing from rationalized society is not action but purpose, a sense of belonging to a unified,
animated, spiritually encompassing world.*).
,For descriptions of some of the tasks faced by such teachers, see, for example, Anthony
V. Alfieri, ReconstructivePoverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100
YALE L.J. 2107 (1991); Ann Shalleck, Constructionsofthe Client Within LegalEducation, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1731 <1993).
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affordable for even fewer. More importantly, while these activities
may feel more like play than the other activities of law school, they
lack two of the crucial elements of true play. First, the studentplayer is not in control of the play. Instead, its pace, parameters,
and goals are all set by an external authority. The student is
always aware that her ability to keep pace, to play within the set
parameters, and to reach the predetermined goal is being judged
and graded. Second, there is no holding environment. Twelve to
sixteen class hours a semester allow no respite. The time pressures
of law school virtually preclude play.
The curtailment of play in law school puts one of the most
important lawyering skills-that is, the ability to maintain
paradox-beyond the reach of most students, at least temporarily.
This ability is not quickly or easily acquired. As Winnicott notes:
"To control what is outside one has to do things, not simply to
think or to wish, and doing things takes time. Playing is doing. 6
Play requires repeated frustration, followed by repeated retreats to
a holding environment, followed by yet another round of creative
forays, of playful experiment.
Some may argue that the ability to maintain paradox, even if it
is a vital lawyering skill, should be acquired before the student
comes to law school, preferably before puberty. In fact, most law
students have acquired that ability, but are stymied when they
attempt to draw on it in a law school context, which impedes even
as it demands play. This is rooted in the unique psychological and
intellectual demands of the paradox which is the law.
The law is stately and ancient; indeed, some of it is quite literally
written in stone. At the same time the law is fluid, always open to
new interpretations. The law must be orderly, predictable, and
certain. It draws on deeply rooted values and shared norms of
justice, but at the same time, each case exposes more uncertainty,
more ambiguity. Each lawyer argues that resolution of that
ambiguity in her client's favor is required by the same deeply
rooted values and shared norms of justice relied on by the other

SPLAYING AND REALITY, supra note 4, at 41; cf PHLI, supranote 13, at 69 ('It is one
of the most oppressive demands of adults that the child should be interested, rather than

take time to find what interests him. Boredom is integral to the process of taking one's
time.").
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lawyer to support the opposite conclusion. Law is like those mad,
meticulous M.C. Escher drawings, in which a formal stone courtyard is shown in impossibly careening perspective 7 or the artist's
own hands grasp the pens with which they draw themselves. The
lawyer unable to maintain paradox is unable to traverse that
courtyard or to truly grasp the law.

reserved.

M.C. Escher, DrawingHands (1948) 48
III. PLAY AND PRACTICE AFTER LAW SCHOOL
The time pressures of practice make law school seem, in hindsight, like a leisurely summer afternoon for some lawyers.49 The
,' This drawing, entitled Relativity, is reprinted at the end of this Essay.
4Reprintedin F.H. BOOL ET AL., M.C. EscHER: His LIFE AND COMPLETE GRAPHIC WORK

294 (J.L. Locher ed., 1982).
" See Amy Stevens, Why Lawyers Are Depreseed,Anxious, Bored Insomniacs, WALL ST.

J., June 12, 1995, at B1, B7 (The psychological agony ofjunior lawyers arises when partners
are omnipotent, and associates are infantilized .... ').
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scope of doctrine, unmanageable during law school, expands
exponentially to preclude any possibility of mastery. The mere
absence of a holding environment in law school seems positively
benign in a world where unseen forces press you constantly toward
the edge
and even your own colleagues threaten to push you
5o
over.
Eventually, however, many lawyers find-or carve out-a niche
in practice which allows them some control over the pace of their
work and provides an acceptable holding environment. Creating
such a niche, unlike law school, is an open-ended process and may
well take years.5 Once this niche is found, however, lawyers
discover that practice offers wonderful possibilities for play. 2
Indeed, the practice of law not only allows play, it demands it. Two
commonplace examples of lawyer play, role-playing and storytelling, illustrate the point.
First, lawyers play by role-playing. While role-play may take
many forms,' I focus here on the most mundane: the lawyer's

I Id. (citing 1990 Johns Hopkins University study showing that 'severe depression is
more likely to occur among lawyers than members of 103 other occupations').
" Those rare students who thrive in law school are generally those who have been able
to approximate this process. See infra note 58 (describing ability of some lawyers and
successful students to create needed down time).
5But see Stevens, supra note 49, at B1 (citing Freud for proposition that 'human beings
need to feel that they control their environment--and have an impact on it,* an experience
denied many young lawyers at big firms). Compare PHILLIPS, supra note 13, at 74:
For the child to be allowed to have what Winnicott calls 'the full course
of the experience" the child needs the use of an environment that will
suggest things without imposing them; not preempt the actuality of the
child's desire by force-feeding, not distract the child by forcing the
spatula into his mouth. It is a process, Wmnicott is saying, that is easily
violated ....
It is an open question how 'meaningful the practice context needs to be for the beginning
lawyer;, that is, how compatible with her own values and goals. While an environment
hostile to the new lawyer's values and goals may preclude any kind of satisfying play, some
new lawyers need play to discover or develop these values. See supra note 43 (describing
effectiveness of role-playing in learning).
' For many lawyers, such as the district attorney who joins a criminal defense firm, this
includes career changes. It may also include the sometimes-hourly transformations of the
sole practitioner, who may counsel a divorce client in the morning and close a commercial
real estate deal in the afternoon, and the multiple roles a lawyer is called upon to assume
within the context of a single case (e.g., interviewer, counselor, drafter, and representative).
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necessary ability to imagine himself in other people's shoes." The
lawyer not only has to understand the legal issue, he has to
understand the motivations, interests, and perspectives of his client
as well as the other parties, their lawyers, and the court. To
negotiate the terrain between these multiple realities, the lawyer
role-plays. Unlike the role-playing assignments of law school, this
does not require diligent preparation and a careful script. It is
instead an internal, intermittent exploration, over the course of the
case, of these other realities. Like a child at play, the lawyer
conjures up other selves. Surrounded by his law books, framed
diplomas, and bar admissions, the staid, suited lawyer plays "dressup." Freed by the demands of the profession, he imagines himself
as an embezzling bank president or even a battered wife. The
lawyer adept at this kind of play is the lawyer whose deep,
sometimes startling, insights often provide the key to intractable
disputes.5
Second, lawyers play by telling stories.' A litigator, for example, must shape the facts into a coherent and compelling story. She
must transform mountains of documents--or, conversely, a bare
record-into a story that rings true, that accounts for the facts, and
that is amply supported by them. This story must be flexible

"At an innovative clinic at Columbia Law School, students learn how to do so in the
context of representing community groups. Mary M. Zulack, Rediscovering Client Decision
Making: The Impact of Role-Playing, 1 CLINIcAL L. REv. 593, 602-603 (1995). For a
description ofsimulation exercises used to encourage students to place less stock in 'lawyerly
constructions," see Charles Lawrence, I, The Word and the River: Pedagogyas Scholarship
as Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2231, 2244-47 (1992).
"I recall, for example, an adversary's explanation to the judge, who had instructed our
divorcing clients to divide their personal property "equally." The judge could not understand
how this had led to six hours of bickering, with resolution nowhere in sight. "My client is
still in love with his wife," my adversary explained. "He'll say anything just to keep her in
the same room with him." The judge quickly drew a line down the middle of the property
list we had submitted, allowing the wife to choose which half she wanted.
Many lawyers find it especially useful to imagine themselves in the court's shoes. See
generally Pierre Schlag, Anti-Intellectualism, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1111 (1995) (criticizing
tendency ofAmerican legal thinkers to identify with judges).
w Many commentators have noted the centrality of storytelling to lawyering. See, e.g.,
Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991) (examining
emergence of feminist narrative scholarship as distinctive form of critical legal discourse);
Alfieri, supra note 45 (discussing notion of poverty law advocacy as medium of storytelling).
See generally Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2073 (1989) (exploring the
importance of narrative in legal practice and scholarship).
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enough to accommodate new facts as the case unfolds, but firm
enough to resist an adversary's attempt to turn it against her
client. The litigator tells the story to her client, and she tells
variations to her adversary and to the court, drawing on all of them
in settlement negotiations. Each story is based on the same facts,
but each is given a different emphasis, a different "spin." Like roleplay in practice, and unlike most work in law school, storytelling is
rarely condensed into a frantic weekend of preparation. Rather,
the stories emerge as the case evolves, shifting and changing as
new facts are discovered and new theories considered.
Whether role-playing, storytelling, or playing in a different way,
the lawyer needs the steady backdrop of a holding environment if
her work is to feel like play. She must be able to opt out, to drop
into "the sense that one is held.., that one will not be dropped...
that one can experience oneself and be oneself.'
Holding environments are as diverse as the lawyers who arrange them. For
some it is primarily a time, an hour during which nothing else will
be scheduled. During this time, they savor the "sense that there is
a safety net present, rather than the hard concrete of the circus
floor.""s For others, it is primarily a place, perhaps the book-lined
walls and dark wood of their own offices, especially in the quiet
hours after six." Some lawyers find a holding environment in an
activity-swimming, running, and even, it has been claimed,
playing golf-which can be taken up almost anywhere at anytime
17 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (describing need for holding environment).
' Id. Lawyers, like everyone else, spend this time in a wide range of activities. They
drink coffee and skim newspapers, go for walks, go to museums, play with their dogs, and
listen to music. Because their work days are typically so long, however, lawyers have to be
diligent and resourceful in building in efficient down time. I have noticed that this is a skill
shared by some of our most successful students. Unlike their classmates, who have 4too
much to do to run" or who may spend hours in desultory activities that do not refresh them,
these students have found a way to 'experience oneself and be oneself,' while meeting the
demands of law school
2ying to work through a problem while engaged in such activities, unfortunately, may
deprive us of their benefits. At the same time, problems that we do not try to work through
often seem to resolve themselves.
IOther places where lawyers may be found include libraries (especially law libraries)
and courthouse coffee houses. Again, however, the lawyer must feel free of expectations for
a place to function as a holding environment. As a law student, I was unable to free myself
from the demands of my classes in the law library, although the undergraduate library
worked well.
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as the need is felt and professional demands allow. Many lawyers
will swear that such activities make work possible. By serving the
function of a holding environment, they also make play possible.
Role-playing and storytelling are not like play; they are play. 6°
They provide an outlet for tension as well as a constructive channel
for it. They facilitate social interaction and "helpf] define and
redefine the boundaries between ourselves and others.6 1 They
provide an opportunity to practice skills and work through
problems, and they enrich experience. 2 Role-playing and storytelling are not the only forms of lawyer play, nor do all lawyers
play. But very good lawyers engage in some form of play because
that is how they sustain and hone the "ability to maintain paradox"
that makes them very good.
For these lawyers, their work is their play. This is why so many
lawyers are reluctant to retire, why emeritus professors still come
to their offices, and why mandatary retirement for judges is such
a bad idea. Lawyers accept, of course, that play is often cut off by
the practical demands of practice, just as play is cut off by the
practical demands of law school. But lawyers know that as long as
they practice law they will be able to resume their play in a later
case, in an article, or in a conversation with a colleague or even a
former law teacher.63
Law teachers understand the importance of play. This is why we
bring our manuscripts on vacation, why we coach moot court teams,
and why we construct simulation exercises for our classes. Many
of us regret that law students do not have more time for play, even

'
n playing, and perhaps only in playing, the child or adult is free to be creative....
(This] takes into account the difficult part of the theory of the transitional object, which is
that a paradox is involved which needs to be accepted, tolerated, and not resolved."
WINNICOTT, PLAYING AND REAIrIy, supra note 4, at 53.

As Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi notes:
The universal precondition for flow is that a person should perceive that
there is something for him or her to do, and that he or she is capable of
doing it. In other words, optimal experience requires a balance between
the challenges perceived in a given situation and the skills a person
brings to it.
Csikszentmihalyi, supra note 2, at 30.
61
GROLNICK, supra note 4, at 35.

62 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (describing these benefits of play).
' Practitioners and former students often call with knotty legal problems. They say that
they want "advice," but most simply want to play-to explore the ambiguities of the law.
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as we continue to assign reading and papers that barely leave
students time to eat and sleep. We are hoping to expedite the
mastery of doctrine necessary for play, or at least to expose the
student to the provocative case that will inspire it.
The mastery of doctrine necessary for the practice of law is like
the mastery of draftsmanship necessary for an Escher drawing.
This mastery is in inevitable tension with the moment of imaginative flight, of creative play, which reveals the law as fluid and
opens it to new interpretations. The practice of law requires this
mastery, but play brings the law to life. Like any other form of
play, the practice of law as play can only be facilitated; it cannot be
taught." This is a paradox and it is rooted in the deeper paradox
of the law itself.

~W~A

- .a
© 1996 TMC. Escher/Cordon Art-Baarn-Holland. All
rights reserved.

M.C. Escher, Relativity (1953)6
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Cf. supranote 19 (describing how W'mnicott facilitated play with the oequiggle game).

' Reprinted in BOOL ET AL., supra note 48, at 306.

